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Common property resources--community pastures, for- 
ests, waste lands-although rare in Western countries today, are still an im- 
portant form of natural resource endowment in the rural areas of developing 
countries. Broadly defined, common property resources are those used by an 
entire community without any exclusive individual ownership or access rights. 
In the absence of regulatory institutions, rapid population growth may lead to 
degenerative patterns of use (e.g.. overgrazing) and the gradual depletion of 
common property resources. Indeed, as popularly conceived, depletion of such 
resources is a straightforward consequence of rapid population growth. Several 
recent studies have suggested, however, that the impact of rapid population 
growth on natural resources is not at all straightf~rward.~ These studies indicate 
that the effects of rapid population growth are mediated by institutional factors 
and often overshadowed by pressures arising from changing market conditions. 
This paper examines the decline of common property resources in the 
arid zone of Rajasthan in India and the factors underlying the decline. In 
Rajasthan, the introduction of land reforms in the 1950s disrupted traditional 
arrangements that protected and regulated the use of common property re- 
sources. Commercialization, population pressure, and large-scale adoption of 
tractors have played important roles in the resource depletion process; but their 
impact has been greatly magnified by the circumstances created by various 
provisions of the land reforms program. 
The setting 
The arid zone of western Rajasthan, part of the great Indian desert, is spread 
over 202,000 square kilometers and accounts for 62 percent of the tropical 
arid ,area of India. The agriculture of the region is characterized by crop- and 
livestock-based farming. Studies have repeatedly emphasized the comparative 
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advantage livestock farming enjoys over crop farming in the region, and {he 
region's comparative advantage over other regions in the matter of livestock 
farming3 This comparative advantage is the product of two factors: (1) the 
agro-climatic and land resource base of the arid region, and (2) formal and 
informal institutional arrangements governing the usage of the natural resource 
base. 
Low and erratic rainfall, highly erodible and infertile sandy soils, and 
a variety of hardy grasses and bushes make most of the region more suited to 
pasture-based livestock raising than to sustained arable farming. Livestock, 
because they are mobile, are less subject to the adverse impact of localized 
droughts than crops are. This advantage is lost, however, if a farmer's livestock 
must depend solely on his own forage and water resources. In other words, 
the mobility-linked advantage of livestock becomes a reality only when they 
have easy and unrestricted access to spatially differentiated land resources. It 
is in response to the need for unrestricted mobility of livestock that common 
property resources or common access resources emerged as the dominant form 
of resource ownership and usage by village communities in this region, as in 
many other parts of the world having similar ecological  condition^.^ In dry 
areas of Rajasthan, the village-level common property resources that have 
effectively supported livestock farming since the feudal period include: 
- Community grazing lands, including permanent pastures, uncultivable 
and cultivable wastelands, and fallow lands contributing to the grazing 
area of the village 
- Village forests and woodlands, including Oruns (forests protected on 
religious grounds) 
- Private croplands available for public grazing after harvest of crops 
- Community threshing and waste-dumping grounds 
- Community ponds and animal watering points 
- Migration routes and facilities 
- Community facilities for stock breeding 
Methods and data sources 
This paper uses evidence from selected villages of Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, and 
Nagaur districts in Rajasthan for the early 1950s to the early 1980s. The three 
districts represent three subzones within the arid region in terms of aridity and 
density of human and livestock populations. Annual rainfall averages 179mm, 
264mm, and 310mm in Jaisalmer. Jodhpur, and Nagaur, respcctively. The 
population density (according to the 1971 census) is 4, 50, a'nd 71 persons per 
square kilometer in Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, and Nagaur, respectively. The number 
of cattle, sheep, and goats-the key categories of livestock sustained by com- 
mon property resources in the area-expressed in terms of animal units is 6 
per 100 hectares of alca and 164 per 100 persons of rural population in Jais- 
almer. The corresponding figures for Jodhpur are 41 and 124, and for Nagaur 
they are 70 and 11 1. Mixed farming based on annual cropping and livestock 
raising is common to all three districts, although the importance of crop farming 
increases as one moves from areas of lower to higher rainfall. 
Most of the data presented were collected during the period 1963-66 
when the author worked for the Central Arid Zone Research Institute (CAZRI). 
An important objective of the field studies was to examine the existing pattern 
of land resource use and to compare it with the potential pattern emerging 
from CAZRI's resource conservation and development techn~logies.~ In 1973 
and 1978, the author visited the same villages again and documented changes 
through quick surveys in Nagaur and Jodhpur  district^.^ In 1983, during a 
short visit, data were updated on specific issues. Six villages from which data 
were collected in all four rounds are the principal focus of this paper. 
Considering the total size of the arid zone, findings from six villages 
can only be suggestive. It should be noted, however, that the broad pattern of 
change, closely observed and documented in the selected villages, was also 
evident more widely in the areas to which these villages belong. 
Decline of common property resources 
From the early 1950s to early 1980s, common property resources in the arid 
zone declined in area and deteriorated in quality. 
Grazing lands 
Village forests, permanent pastures, uncultivable and cultivable wastelands, 
and croplands fallowed for longer periods broadly constitute the total grazing 
area in the villages. This area is supplemented by cropland that acquires the 
character of a common property resource in the post-crop season when anyone 
can graze his animals there. The changing situation of croplands, including 
current fallows, as a source of grazing will be discussed separately. Table 1 
TABLE 1 Changes over time in common grazing areas a s  a percent of total 
geographic area in six villages in three districts of western Rajasthan 
Percent or total area In study villages 
Nagaur Jodhpur Jaisalmer 
Grazing area 1953-54 1%- 1972-73 1977-78 1953-54 1963-64 1972-73 1977-78 1953-54 1963-64 
Forests 2 1 0 0 3 2 2 2 0 0 
Permanent 
pastures 6 3 I I 7 3 3 3 3 I 
Uncultivahle 
wastelands 17 13 I2 I I 13 10 10 9 38 35 
Cultivable 
wastelands 18 10 7 6 15 7 4 3 26 12 
Fallow lands 
(other than cur- 
rent fallows) 15 10 8 6 18 13 10 9 16 13 
-- --- - -- 
- - 
SOURCE. From patwari records,dunng successive rounds of field work The data relate to two vrllages in each district. 
Data for 1953-54 were culled from village records. 
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provides relevant information on all other grazing areas. The proportions of 
common property resources used for grazing in the total land area of the study 
villages is fast declining. Despite differences in the extent of decline between 
districts and communities, a few common features are revealed in Table 1. 
Significantly, the decline in area of common property resources was 
greater during the decade preceding 1963-64 than in the succeeding years. 
This was the peak period of land reforms in the region. Forests and permanent 
pastures, which were already small in area, declined the most. The fallow 
lands declined mainly through a fall in the practice of long-fallow rotation. 
The trends in the decline of common property resources are also evident 
for the arid zone as a whole. Land utilization trends for all 11 districts com- 
prising the arid zone of western Rajasthan are shown in Table 2. The common 
property resources (grazing areas) in the region have been declining consistently 
since 1951-52, the first date for which district-level data on land utilization 
are available. Again, the decline was greatest during 1951-52 to 196142- 
the period of land reforms. 
One consequence of the decline in grazing space is the increase in density 
of animals per unit of common grazing land. In the arid zone as a whole, the 
density of livestock expressed in terms of animal units increased from 39 animal 
units per 100 hectares of grazing land in 1951-52 to 105 during 1977-78. 
This increase was due in part to an increase in livestock population. According 
to livestock census reports, the number of animals in the arid zone increased 
by 41 percent between 195 1 and 1961 and by 14 percent between 1961 and 
1971. The slower growth of livestock during the latter decade is due partly to 
two severe droughts during this period and partly to declines in grazing area. 
Animal watering points 
Animal watering points are resources important to the support of pasture-based 
livestock farming. Ponds and tanks are scattered throughout grazing areas in 
the villages. They are filled by runoff from their respective catchments, which 
TABLE 2 Changes over time in characteristics of 
common property resources (CPRs) in western 
Rajasthan. 1951 -78 
Characteristic 1951-52 1%1-42 1971-72 1977-78 
Area (million ha) 11.3 9 .8  9.2 8 . 7  
Area as a percent of total geographic area 60.5 51.1 47.9 45. I 
Percent decline in CPR area over previous 
period - 12.4 6.7 4.5 
Livestock per 100 ha of CPRs (no. of animal 
units) 39 86 94 105 
Population per sq. km. in the zonea 30 39 5 1 N .A.  
NOTE: Common property resources include forests. permanent pastures. uncultivable 
and cultivable wa*telands. and fallow lands other than current fallows. 
"he population density was 18 per sq. km. according to the 1901 census. At the time 
of the last census before Independence (1941), the population density was 26 per sq. km. 
SOURCE: For 1951-52, Deputy Director of Land Revenues (Records). Government 
of Rajasthan. Ajmer. Fw all other years, Statistical Abstracts of Rajrsthan for different 
are also used for grazing. Depending upon their capacity, these ponds supply 
drinking water requirements of animals and humans. They help in the even 
distribution of grazing incidence and ensure some degree of rotational grazing. 
They were dug by the village communities and, at least in the past, were 
maintained (desilted) through the voluntary or enforced labor of the villagers, 
as well as by investing part of the revenue collected through periodic auctioning 
of rights to collect dung and top feeds from around the watering points.' 
Details of the history. current status, usage, and management of these 
watering points were collected from two villages8 and are presented in Table 
3. The number of watering points and the catchment areas of the ponds declined 
dramatically betwien 1953-54 and 1972-73. 
Watering points were depleted because of reductions in their catchment 
areas and neglect of their desilting requirements. The decline in the upkeep of 
the ponds is also indicated in Table 3. Expenditures in terms of labor days on 
desilting of ponds and their inlets for three-year periods ending 1953-54, 1963- 
64, and 1972-73 are presented. Whether one looks at the total expenditure or 
the average expenditure per existing pond, the investment on upkeep of wa- 
tering points declined substantially over time. More revealing is the change in 
source of expenditure, which also partly explains the decline in expenditure. 
Not only did overall expenditures on upkeep of ponds decline, but the people's 
contribution and common property resource revenue (generated through auc- 
tioning of trees, etc.) have disappeared as sources to support the upkeep of 
common property resources. Government grants or relief has proven to be a 
poor substitute for these traditional sources of upkeep. 
TABLE 3 Changes over time in selected measures of status and upkeep of 
animal watering ponds in two  villages in two districts of western Rajasthan, 
1953--73 
Nagaur Jodhpur 
Number of watering ponds 19 10 8 17 Y 9 
Area of catchments (hala 
Total 358 213 1x1 411 282 275 
Average per pond 19 2 1 23 24 31 30 
Ranse 2-86 4-57 1-58 3-90 5-75 2-60 
Modal value 15 35 30 25 40 40 
Water retention capacity (range in months) 1-12 3-8 1-8 2-12 4-9 1-9 
Dcsilting expenses (in terms of labor days) during 
preceding 3 years 
People's contributionb 788 0 0 722 0 0 
Reinvntmcnt of CPR revenue 450 25 0 675 190 0 
Government granurelief 0 238 120 0 240 300 
Average taal expenses per pond 65 26 15 $2 48 33 
a R C ~ M B  arcas of catchments not occupied by private individuals. 
People's contribution estimated on the basis of labor days fixed for each household multiplied by number of relevant 
households in  the case of each tank desilted dunng three yean. The amounts of reinvested revenue of common property 
resources and government grants were converted into labor days using wage rates for the relevant period. 
SOURCE: Based on old and current village records. 
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Private croplands: seasonal common 
property resources 
Public grazing on private croplands in the post-crop season is an important 
informal arrangement helping stock raisers. Because of this practice of periodic 
common access, the cropped area could be described as seasonal common 
property resources. Depending upon crop and soil moisture conditions in a 
given season, the available forage consists of crop leftovers, undergrowth, 
resprouting of harvested crops. and bushes. The net sown area in the arid 
region as a whole has increased from about 6.6 million hectares in 1956-57 
to 8.3 million hectares during 1977-78. Despite an increase of about 25 percent 
in the seasonal common property resources for grazing, their contribution to 
total forage supplies for grazing seems to have declined in recent years. The 
large-scale introduction of tractors during the period under review has meant 
that soil preparation for the next season is finished soon after the harvest of 
the previous crop.9 This deprives the animals of any post-harvest grazing in 
the seasonal common property resources. Use of tractors has also led to a 
decline in the grazing space available from long fallows, cultivable wastes, 
and the like, because tractors are not subject to the constraint a very short wet 
period imposes on soil preparation by draft animals-a constraint that in the 
past restricted cropping to a limited area. 
Qualitative degradation of common 
property resources 
Qualitative degradation of common property resources is partly a consequence 
of their quantitative decline and unregulated use. Degradation of resources is 
easier to see than to quantify. It is difficult to find any official records covering 
qualitative aspects of common property resources. Yet such phenomena as 
conversion of pastures into barren patches near habitations, and substitution 
of perennial edible species by annual nonedibles have been documented through 
detailed surveys in the arid zone.I0 According to these surveys, the carrying 
capacity of such lands has declined far below the present rate of stocking. 
Indirect and rough indications of qualitative degradation of common 
property resources in the study villages were revealed by case histories of a 
few selected common property resources. Since common property resources 
constituted important sources of revenue for the Jagirdar or Thikanedar (land- 
lords in the pre-Independence period), some useful records were available as 
early as 1945. They indicated the volume of products collected from common 
property resources and the revenue generated by their auction. Details for four 
locations, whose area has remained unchanged, are reported in Table 4 to 
illustrate the decline in the productivity of common property resources due to 
qualitative deterioration. Availability of timber, top feeds, perennial grasses, 
and gum declined in all four locations. Felling of mature trees and the growth 
of stunted and bushy trees, elimination of useful bushes, and a decline in 
superior perennial grasses were features of the environmental degradation in 
these areas. 
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TABLE 4 Decline in productivity of common property resources a s  illustrated 
by histories of four forest and grazing plots in a village of Nagaur district, 
1945-65 
Production 
Plot 1 (6 ha) Plot 2 (10 ha) Plot 3 112 ha) Plot 4 (12 ha) 
1945-47 1%3-65 1945-47 1963-65 1945-47 1963-65 1945-47 1963-65 
Timber (bubul and indok trees) 
Top feed (loong from khejri) 
Top feed @ala from ber bushes) 
Fuel wood (khejri, ker, rtc.) 
Cut grass (kured and dhaman 
perenn~als) 
Cut grass (bharwr, etc. annuals) 
Dung collection 
Gum (babul and indok trees) 
- -- - -- - - 
NOTE Gum IS measured In kllograrns All other products are measured In canloads The we~ght of a cartload ranged 
from 5 to 10 qulntals depending upon the product ( e  g , fuel wotxi rcrru5 top teeds) under question By 1958 due to 
cnlroduct~on of rubber-t~red bullock carts (chhakuda) the standard of canload changed Compued to e u l ~ e r  wooden-trred 
bullock carts, the chhakuda could accommodate 50 percent more product by volume and uelght However, rhe figures 
repofled In the table are In terms of load camed by wooden-t~red bullock carts 
SOURCE Auct~on records of ex-ldg~rdar and the vllldge Pdnchayat In the poct-land reforms period, the practrce of 
aucooning has decllned malnly because there 1s nor enough matendl to auctlon T h ~ s  In turn IS a re~ult of ellrnrnat~on of 
moyt of the trees and complete destruct~on of even roots of perenn~al grassep 
Causes of the decline of common 
property resources 
The decline of common property resources is a result of multiple forces. It is 
often not easy to measure the role of specific factors in the process of change. 
However, a description of the circumstances influencing people's decisions 
and actions regarding the status and usage of common property resources can 
shed light on the relative roles of different factors. Three factors that seem to 
have contributed significantly to the decline of common property resources in 
the arid zone are: (1) institutional change in the form of land reforms during 
the early 1950s; (2) population growth; and (3) increased commercialization 
of the desert economy in general and of common property resources-based 
activities in particular-aided in part by technological innovation. 
Land reforms 
The introduction of land reforms during the early 1950s constituted a major 
institutional intervention in the rural sector of the arid zone. The reforms 
encouraged the privatization of common property resources for use as crop- 
lands; drastically reduced the private cost of cultivating submarginal lands 
(including common property resources); and dismantled the traditional arrange- 
ments that protected and regulated the use of common property resources. 
Prior to the introduction of land reforms, the feudal landlord was the 
sole custodian or "owner" of the village lands." All farmers except his kins- 
men wen the landlord's tenants. They paid him substantial rent in kind (one- 
254 Decllne of Common Property Resources 
fourth to one-half of farm produce) for the land they cultivated. Although the 
common property resources belonged to the landlord, villagers had access to 
them in return for certain charges. While a fixed proportion of land revenue 
from cultivated land went as payment to the ruler of the state, revenue from 
the common property resources went to the landlord's own exchequer. (At 
times, a part of the revenue would be reinvested to increase or sustain income 
from the land.) Methods of revenue generation frorn common property re- 
sources included a fixed grazing tax per head of animal; the auctioning of 
produce from common property resources; a number of different levies on the 
users of the land; and penalties for violation of a variety of regulations imposed 
on users. The number of different levies and taxes imposed in the princely 
State of Jodhpur in 1941 varied from 50 to 150, depending on location, of 
which 64 were considered legitimate by an enquiry committee appointed by 
the ruler of the state.I2 Many of these related to common property resources. 
Through levies and penalties on the use of common property resources, the 
landlord exploited the peasants. However, as a byproduct of this exploitative 
mechanism emerged a management system that protected, maintained, and 
regulated use of common property resources. Table 5, based on details from 
study villages as well as other studies." lists the practices that were essential 
parts of the management of common property resources in the past and indicates 
which are still prevalent. 
Following land reforms the Jagirdari system and its variants were abol- 
ished. Peasants were made owners of the lands that they formerly cultivated 
as tenants. The land revenue tax payable annually to the government on these 
lands was drastically reduced (Table 6). Vast areas of common property re- 
sources, mostly submarginal lands unsuited to cultivation, were distributed as 
croplands to the landless as well as to those who already had land. Within a 
decade of land reforms, in the arid region as a whole, 3.4 million hectares of 
common property resources were transferred to private ownership for the pur- 
pose of arable farming. This meant an increase of nearly 50 percent in the 
land put under the plow in the arid zone. It also meant a decline of between 
7 and 26 percent in common property resources for grazing. l4 
The ownership or custodianship of the remaining common property re- 
sources was transferred to the village community, represented by village Pan- 
chayats (elected councils). The provision of common access continued as in 
the past, but the old system of management of common property resources 
disappeared (Table 5). The village Panchayats in practice did not impose 
grazing taxes and levies on users of common property resources, despite the 
fact that they were legally empowered to do so. The maintenance and upkeep 
of common property resources suffered as the Panchayats depended more and 
more on assistance from the government for this purpose. The main reason 
for the ineffectiveness of Panchayats, despite their domination by ex-feudal 
landlords in some cases, is that they were neither as authoritarian as Jagirdars, 
nor bold enough to take hard decisions (such as imposing taxes) that would 
displease their voters. 
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TABLE 5 Management of common property resources in western 
Rajasthan: whether past practices continue following land reforms 
Practice 
Practice 
continues 
Indicators of private cost of use of 
lPRs 
irazing tax (ghas mari) 
ce for grazing in some CPRs on 
riority basis 
~ivestock-related levies (laag baag) 
Compulsory labor contribution for 
desilting ponds (begur) 
Penalties for disregarding grating 
regulationsY 
Indicators of regulated use of 
CPRs 
Evenly scattered watering points 
Deliberate rotation of grazing 
around different watering points 
Periodical closure of parts of CPRs 
(e.g. chirrakhi )  
Periodic restriction on entry of anl- 
ma1 category (e.g.. sheep!cattle) to 
pans of CPRs 
Posting of watchman (hnwar ia )  
with power to enforce regulations 
Village phrak (enclosure) to im- 
pound animals violating 
regulationsb 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Practice 
Indicators of revenue earningC 
Auction of dung-collection rights 
from CPRs 
Auction of top feeds from CPRs 
Aucftonlsale of wood from CPRs 
Penalties for  breaking grazing 
regulat~ons 
Cash and kind taxes and lev~es from 
users of CPRs 
Indicators of investment in CPRs 
Periodic desilting of pondsd 
Payment to watchman (kanwarfa) 
Maintenance expense5 of commu 
nity bullse 
Suppon to scouts to survey water 
and fodder situation on m~gration 
routes befnre animals' migration 
during drought 
Practice 
continua 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
a Panchayats also have provisions for imposlnp penalties. but such cases relate to trespassing by persons 
on migration routes during droughts. or to complaints of damage to one's crops by another's animals, wh~ch 
arc brought to officials for impounding. 
Each Panchayat also maintains a pharak, but animals impounded arc those that enter somebody's cropped 
?Id. 
'eudal authorities collected substantial revenue fmm CPRs but reinvested only a small proportion. 
Periodic desilting of pond\ now takes place through government relief expenses during drought years. 
Some Panchayats have provis~ons toward maintenance of community hulls. 
SOURCE: N. S. Jodha. "Causes and consequences of decline of common propeny rrsources In the arid 
region of Rajasthan." progress report. ICRISAT. Economics Program. Patanchrru (A.P.). India. 
Overexploitation and depletion of common property resources resulted 
largely because there was (and remains) no private cost to using these resources. 
Estimates based on detailed investigations in some villages of Nagaur district l 5  
indicate that prior to land reforms the animal grazer had to pay Rs41 per 
household in cash or kind (at 1976-77 prices) plus Rs1.25 grazing tax per 
animal per year (at 1976-77 prices) (US $1 = 12.50 Rupees). After the land 
riforms this cost was reduced to zero (see Table 6). 
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TABLE 6 Data relating to private costs of land use before and after 
land reforms: selected villages of western Rajasthan. 195065 
Pre-Iand Post-land ( Re-land Post-land 
reforms reforms 
(195b51) (1964-65) 
reforms reforms 
(1950-51) (1!X&6S) 
Population growth 
Better cropland 
(chahi) 
Pearl millet yield 
(kgiha) 520 520 
Times cropped in 
5 yearsa 4 5 
Land rent 
( ~ s l h a ) ~  83 6 
Submarginal land 
(harani) 
Pearl rn~llet yield 
(kgtha) ?M) 200 
Times cropped in 
5 years' 2 3 
Land rent 
( ~ s i h a ) ~  16 1 .SO 
Pearl millet-average 
cost 
of production 
(Rstha) N.A. 285 
Increased population pressure is widely considered an important contributor 
to shrinkage and depletion of common property resources. The relative resource 
scarcity created by increased population density is thought to induce privati- 
zation of resources for reasons of efficiency and internalization of gains from 
resource use.I6 In the case of the arid zone of Rajasthan, however, the role of 
population in the decline of common property resources does not appear to be 
dominant. Although no long-term records are available to measure the rela- 
tionship, scattered and circumstantial evidence supports this view. 
In the arid zone as a whole, population grew from 3.6 million in 1901 
to 10.2 million in 1972, a growth of 183 percent. This is a greater increase 
than that registered for Rajasthan State, 150 percent, or for India as a whole, 
132 percent, during the same period." However, there are no data on land 
Grazing land 
(gochar) 
Grazing tax 
(Rslanimal) 1.25 0 
Other livestock- 
related levies1 
penalties 
(Rslhousehold) 23 0 
Value of contri- 
bution to protec- 
tionlmaintenance 
of pasturettank. 
etc. (Rslhousehold) 18 0 
Anrmal-product 
prices. e t ~ . ~  
Wool 
(Rs1100 kg) 90 480 
Ghee 
(Rslkg) 5 18 
Milk 
(Rsllitre) N. A. 0.60 
NOTE: Money values calculated at 1976-77 prices. 
a Frequency of cropping due to the practice of periodic fallowing of land. This also indicates the number 
of times when rent (25 percent of crop'produce) was paid during pre-land reforms period. 
Land revenue during the pre-land reforms period was charged in the form of 25 percent of the gnin yield 
of the plot whenever it was cropped. The annual rent has been calculated by multiply~ng the money value 
(at 1976-77 prices) of crop share by number of years when land is cropped and dividing by five. Land 
reforms fixed the land revenue on a permanent basis at a much lower rate, as indicated in the table. 
' Pnces as obtained in the villages. 
SOURCE: Jodha, cited in note IS. Details relate to a cluster of three villages in Nagaur disuict. Data 
were collected from village records and interviews during field work in 1963-66 (see Jodha, cited in note 
5). 
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utilization prior to 1951 against which to assess the consequences of this 
growth. 
Privatization of common property resources in the arid zone has invar- 
iably meant conversion of common property resources land into cropland. 
Hence, the impact of population growth can be judged in tenns of increase in 
the area of cropland as well as the decline in the extent of cornmon property 
resources. The population of the arid zone increased by 29.8 percent from 
195 1 to 196 1 and by 27.9 percent from 1961 to 197 1. Croplands increased by 
50 percent and 7 percent respectively during the same periods. The area of 
common property resources (on a larger base), as calculated from Table 2, 
declined by around 16 percent and 7 percent respectively. Crude as they are, 
the above figures do not indicate a correspondence between population trends 
and land use trends. 
Historical evidence Indirect and circumstantial evidence suggests that 
traditional management systems prevented rapid population growth from ex- 
erting a corresponding pressure on the land during the feudal (pre-land reform) 
period. As reported and documented by Rai,Is one of the major problems of 
peasants in the princely State of Jodhpur (covering five out of eleven arid 
districts) was that despite substantial increases in the peasant population (as 
high as 50 percent in some villages mentioned by Rai) during 1910-40, the 
Jagirdars did not allow additions to cropland from common property resources. 
Instead, they raised the levies from one-fourth to one-half of the produce on 
the already-established and overcrowded croplands. and proposed to charge 
the same (increased) revenue rate for the submarginal (common property re- 
sources) lands, if and when any peasant agreed to accept such lands for 
cropping. 
Examination of records relating to land revenue collected by Jagirdars 
in our study villages also reveals an insignificant extent of conversion of fallow 
land into cropland. The area of cropland (including net sown area, current and 
long fallow) increased by only 1-3 percent during 1935-51. The population 
of the same villages increased by 43-45 percent during this period. 
In the face of exploitation by the Jagirdars, the peasants could satisfy 
their increased demand for cropland only through reduction in the extent of 
long fallow. (Boserup describes such intensification of land use in response to 
population density at the global level in prehistoric times.)19 However, as 
indicated in Table 1 ,  long fallow represents only a small fraction of total 
common property. 
The terms and conditions governing the use of cropland during the feudal 
period were not conducive to the conversion of submarginal grazing lands into 
cropland. Most of the lands of the arid zone are submarginal in physical terms 
and not suited to cultivation. During the feudal period they were submarginal 
, on economic grounds as well. Since the Jagirdar took one-fourth to one-half 
of the farm produce as rent, the tenant's share was not enough to compensate 
for the cost and effort of raising crops on poor land. Furthermore, the Jagirdar 
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imposed more levies on crop producers than on animal raisers. Hence. despite 
increased population pressure, there was not enough incentive for tenants to 
extend crop farming by exploiting common property resources. 
Besides the harsh terms and conditions imposed by Jagirdars on tenants, 
the traditional occupational structure contributed to lower pressure on cropland 
despite increases in population. The traditional caste occupations-services 
and crafts under the Jajmani system and, outside i t ,  exclusive engagement in 
livestock raising, petty trading, and so on-kept a substantial proportion of 
village populations away from the croplands. 
Demographic factors in the post-land reforms phase The introduction 
of land reforms, combined with other post-Independence changes, unleashed 
the forces of population growth. The land reforms of the early 1950s not only 
liberally distributed submarginal lands (common property resources) to the 
people, they also changed the economics of land use. Land was granted to 
people for nominal annual rents payable to the government. In Nagaur district, 
rent payable as crop share to the Jagirdar was Rs16 per hectare (at 1976-77 
prices); following land reforms, fixed rent on submarginal lands was Rs 1.50 
per hectare (see Table 6). The low fixed rent reflected the low crop productivity 
of these lands as compared with fertile lands in well-endowed areas. The 
reduced cost of submarginal lands, accompanied by the government's liberal 
approach to their distribution (partly to project a democratic image in areas 
formerly ruled by feudal lords), induced people to acquire private lands at the 
cost of common property resources. 
Changes in the occupational structure of villages also increased depen- 
dence on, and therefore demand for, cropland. The Jajmani system governing 
patron-client relationships had tied many rural households to their traditional 
caste occupation (services and crafts). This system was disrupted following 
the introduction of the land reforms, and no substitution emerged for the 
Jagirdar's authority to oversee and enforce norms of intergroup relations.'O 
Perpetuation of dependence on traditional caste occupations now appeared less 
economically attractive than fanning land available for a very nominal charge. 
Subsidies, credit, and other forms of assistance available mainly to land owners 
under various development programs were further incentives to land ownership. 
This induced traditionally noncultivating households to acquire cropland." 
A little-publicized social reform movement among low-caste craftsmen 
(chamars, regars, bhambis) was another important development beginning in 
1949. Entire communities gave up caste occupations (leatherwork, weaving, 
etc.)-jobs that, according to the caste leaders of Untouchables, were respon- 
sible for their lower social status. Throughout northwestern Rajasthan, crop 
farming was adopted in place of crafts. 
During the feudal period, an important category of absentee landlords 
consisted of land owners from the Rajput caste who worked in the military 
forces of princely states. With the merger of princely states in the Indian Union 
during 1950-52, most of these m y  units were disbanded. These people 
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returned home to find their lands already transferred to their tenants. The 
rehabilitation of these and other absentee landlords who lost their lands during 
the reforms again led to distribution of lands once held as common property 
resources. 
As these examples illustrate, demographic factors have exerted increased 
pressure on common property resources largely through the opportunities for 
cultivation created by various provisions of the land reforms program. Unfor- 
tunately, the categories used by census reports are too broad to be able to 
quantify occupational and other shifts in a way that would fully demonstrate 
the changes brought about by land reforms. 
Commercialization of community property 
resources-based activities 
Because of the harsh desert conditions and the absence of even a minimum 
transportation network, most villages in the arid zone, until recently, were 
physically isolated from wider markets. Whole village economies were sub- 
sistence-oriented. Due to improved infrastructure and transportation facilities, 
the villages are now better linked with the market centers. Barter has been 
replaced by a largely monetized economy; visiting caravans of traders have 
been replaced by regular marketing arrangements. Consequently, the subsis- 
tence requirements of producers and local demand are no longer important 
determinants of demand for several products of the arid lands, particularly 
animal products. Marketability and value of products have increased substan- 
tially, especially in the case of wool, mutton, milk, milk products, and so on. 
Pnces of such products, net of inflation, increased by roughly 350-550 percent 
during the 15 years ending 1964-65 (see Table 6). The resulting adoption of 
sheep and goat raising (an occupation traditionally followed by low-caste poor 
groups) by high-caste rich farmers in different areas in recent years has added 
o the pressure on common property resources.22 
Profitability rather than concern for upkeep of common property re- 
sources has become the guiding force behind the choice of enterprises and 
usage pattern of common property resources.23 Privatization of common prop- 
erty resources, through legal processes or illegal seizure, and overexploitation 
by increasing the number of animals on common property resources have been 
the major consequences. 
Technological innovation The introduction of irrigation, fertilizers, and 
improved seed varieties has affected a few parts of the arid zone. The most 
important technological change influencing the status of common property 
resources, however, was the widespread introduction of tractors. The intro- 
duction was initially supported by government subsidies to farmers and sub- 
sequently gained momentum due to its commercial profitability. For the region 
as a whole, the number of tractors almost tripled, from 2,251 in 1961 to 6,652 
in 1971 ,Z4 and it has increased further since then. In our study of the arid zone, 
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in a cluster of six villages the number of tractors increased from 10 in 1964- 
65 to 59 in 1973-74, and the proportion of net cropped area to total land area 
increased from 44 percent to 81 percent during the same period. 
Besides the poor soils, a major constraint to successful cropping on arid 
lands is the shortness of the wet period required for sowing. Using draft animals 
(i.e.. bullocks and camels), it was difficult to sow large areas in the time 
available. The introduction of tractors eases this constraint enormously. Even 
small farmers rent tractors. This has induced businessmen to acquire tractors 
for hire.15 These practices reduce the extent of short and long fallows and 
promote conversion of submarginal common property resources into cropland. 
Consequences of decline in common 
property resources 
The decline in common property resources has several implications. Among 
the most significant are the long-term implications of increased intensity of 
use of submarginal lands, the distributive implications of privatization of com- 
mon property resources, and the impact on livestock farming. 
Long-term implications 
Increased intensity of use of submarginal lands (i.e., through crop farming 
instead of animal grazing) is not a consequence of privatization of common 
property resources per se, but rather of the usage practices that accompany 
privatization. In the case of the arid zone of Rajasthan (unlike the situation in 
Europe following privatization of common property resources), privatization 
has invariably meant putting the land under plow. This practice strains the 
limited use-capability of the land. The expected (and in some cases already 
visible) consequences are soil erosion and decline in overall crop yields. An 
analysis of area and production data from the early 1950s to the early 1970s 
for the region as a whole reveals that the successive additions to the area 
devoted to rainfed crops have led to corresponding declines in yields per 
hectare.26 The decline in the productivity of remaining (overused) common 
property resources was illustrated in Table 4. 
Distributive implications 
Distributing common property resources to the poor deprives them of collective 
gains, while improving the position of individuals who receive the land. We 
do not have enough data to assess the net gain or loss to the poor following 
the privatization of common property resources. But limited evidence suggests 
that privatization has helped well-endowed land owners more than the poor. 
As shown in Table 7, in the study villages farm households owning more than 
10 hectares of land prior to privatization acquired 59 and 62 percent of total 
privatized lands in the villages of Nagaur and Jodhpur districts, respectively. 
On average they added more land to their existing holdings than did poor 
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households. Furthermore, virtually all the common property resources with 
more fertile soils (e.g., forest, tankbeds, etc.) were acquired by large farmers. 
Most of the poor received their land following official action on their formal 
application. Large farmers' principal mechanisms for obtaining common prop- 
erty resource lands were either fabricating proof of title to certain pieces of 
land or gaining legal recognition of de facto (illegal) occupancy. 
Impact on l i v e s t o c k  f a r m i n g  
Since livestock farming is the key activity sustained by common property 
resources, the impact of the decline of these resources would be expected to 
be greatest on this enterprise. In view of a number of other developments. 
however-such as improved marketing facilities for animal products, changes 
in the relative profitability of different livestock enterprises, and institutional 
change facilitating or obstructing the migration of different categories of an- 
imals-it is not easy to isolate the impact of the decline in common property 
resources on livestock farming. 
Table 8 compares several aspects of livestock farming in 1963-65 and 
1977-78. The average size of livestock holding expressed in terns of animal 
units has declined. This is true in the case of both small and large farmers. 
The ratio of unproductive animals (young stock, dry cattle, etc.) to productive 
animals has declined. The extent of stall feeding has increased, while the 
dependence on common property resources for grazing has declined. These 
TABLE 7 D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  l a n d  a c q u i r e d  through p r i v a t i z a t i o n  o f  C P R s  
i n  two v i l l a g e s  i n  two d i s t r i c t s  o f  western R a j a s t h a n  
Average size of land holding per household before and after new land 
acquisition 
Nagaur Jodhpur 
Size d land holding Percent of Percent of 
prior to new land Before Afler new land Before After new land 
distribution (ha) (ha) (ha) acquired* (ha) (ha) acquiredD 
None 0 2.11 13 (-) 0 3. I 11 (-) 
Up to 5 3.9 5.4 1 0 i  I )  3.6 5.5 13 (-) 
5-10 7.8 11.5 12 (-) 8 .2  10.2 9 (  2 )  
10-15 12.6 19.6 25 (27) 13.1 20.9 23 (32) 
Above I5 25.5 35.1 34 (63) 20.5 30.4 39 (58) 
NOTE: Data were collected during the first phase of field work (1963-61). They relate to one village 
each in Nagaur and Jodhpur districts. Total number of households and area ~nvolved in the Nagaur village 
an 281 and 74 (ha), respectively; the corresponding figures for the Jodhpur village are 307 rind 77 (ha). 
respectively. The table excludes a few cases In which land Nent to people from neighbring villager; hence 
the percentages do not sum to 100. 
Figures in parentheses indicate the percent sharc of each group in superior type of CPRs privatized. 
including forest lands and areas near watering points. etc.. that have good soils. They are not submarginal 
lands. 
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changes are more pronounced in the case of large farmers. Such changes could 
be attributable to both the decline of common property resources and the 
increased commercial importance of livestock farming. Discarding of unpro- 
ductive animals and greater emphasis on stall feeding help improve efficiency 
and profitability of livestock production. 
Of the remaining two indicators of change shown in the table, the in- 
creased proportion of buffalo is surely a result of improved mechanisms for 
milk marketing. Buffalo milk fetches a higher price than other milk in these 
villages because of its higher fat content. The increased proportions of sheep 
and goats in livestock holdings are a response to a decline in common property 
resources and to higher wool and mutton prices. Cattle find it difficult to graze 
in the poorer quality common property resources, but sheep and goats can 
manage. Similarly, it is easy for sheep owners to migrate,: they are welcome 
in the canal areas of Punjab and Haryana for sheep penning. Cattle owners do 
not have this opportunity. 
Conclusion 
The process of change described in this paper suggests that well-intentioned 
public programs like land reform can deprive a region of its comparative 
advantage in a key economic activity (in this case, livestock farming). Pri- 
vatization raises the cost of livestock raising and, hence, erodes the region's 
comparative advantage. The adjustments to the decline in common property 
BLE 8 C h a n g e s  over t i m e  In l i v e s t o c k  f a r m i n g  i n  two v i l l a g e s  i n  two 
t r l c t s  of western R a j a s t h a n ,  1963-78 
Nagaur Jodhpur 
1963-65 1977-78 1%3-65 1977-78 
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Item farmersa farmersb farmers farmers farmers farmers farmers farmen 
Average size of livestock holding 
(animal units) I5 13 13 9 16 14 I5 9 
Share of sheepigoats in animal units 
(percent) 38 6 42 22 40 9 46 31 
Proportion of buffalo in milch stock 
(percent) 5 23 13 46 6 27 I5 51 
Unproductive animals per productive 
animal (no.) 7 4 6 2 5 3 5 I 
Cattle regularly stallfed (except in 
monsoon) (percent) 6 25 I I 49 5 23 18 57 
Proportion of animal grazing 
days depending on CPRs (percent) 81 59 76 3 1 85 62 76 29 
NOTE: Data relate to one village in each district. Details of the first four items relate to the whole village, while the 
last two items  late to sampk households. The details of only two farming groups m presented to indicate the contrast 
or comparison. 
' Those owning up to 5 hectares of land. 
Those owning 10 or more hectares of land. 
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resources in Rajasthan suggest the directions that will characterize the future 
of livestock farming in the region. The continuing shrinkage and degradation 
of common property resources is likely to force further reductions in the size 
of livestock holdings and changes in their composition. This has already hap- 
pened to some extent, as indicated by the decline in the number of cattle and 
unproductive animals and the increased emphasis on sheep and buffalo raising. 
Another likely consequence is increased dependence on stall-feeding of cattle 
and a greater incidence of seasonal outmigration of sheep. However, the lasting 
consequence of all these changes could be the erosion of comparative advantage 
that the arid zone enjoys in livestock farming. 
Another conclusion from this study relates to the future of common 
property resources in general. Considering their several advantages-such as 
promoting the economic activity best suited to the natural resource base of a 
region, sustaining the rural poor, and ensuring the use of arid lands according 
to their capabilities-there is a strong case for protecting and developing 
common property resources. A government strategy along the following lines 
might reverse the trends illustrated in this paper: a strict ban on further cur- 
tailment of common property resources through privatization; regulated use of 
common property resources, achieved by introducing some element of private 
cost for the users; and designation of common property resources as a source 
of revenue for the Panchayats, to induce them to conserve and systematically 
manage them as productive resources. 
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